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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
person should be heard to complain that he was tried by the wrong
court.21
ELIZABETH 0. ROLLINS.
Courts-Venue--Attempts to Limit Venue Provisions of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act
Congress has provided a special venue statute for cases arising under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act which permits the employee to
sue (1) at the residence of the defendant, (2) where the cause of action
arose, or (3) where the railroad is doing business.' Many employees
have used the third provision as a means of "shopping" for an ad-
vantageous forum, or as a means of forcing railroads to compromise
suits rather than defend in a forum which, although technically proper,
is highly inconvenient to the railroad. The railroads have attempted
to avoid the burdens of such suits by various means, the most re-
cent of which has been a contract with the injured employee limiting
the venue. There had been a conflict in the district courts2 as to the
validity of this type of contract, but recently the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals decided that such an agreement is void under Section 5 of the
FELA as an attempt by the railroad to exempt itself from liability
under the Act.3 The court looked to the history of the special venue
provisions and concluded that they are an inherent part of the employ-
er's liability. Thus, the latest device to narrow these troublesome pro-
visions has failed.
It is important to note at the outset the purpose of the special venue
statute of the FELA. Originally the venue of actions under that Act
was governed by the general provisions applicable to federal courts. In
" There was a peculiarity in the Sutton case which has not been mentioned,
viz., the petition for habeas corpus was brought within the time allowed for appeal.
It would be rare that counsel would make such an error, but where, as here, it
occurs, it seems to penalize the petitioner unduly for his attorney's error in choice
of remedies to refuse to consider the jurisdictional objection because of the guise
in which it was introducd. See Circuit Judge Frank, dissenting in United States
ex rel. Sutton v. Mulcahy, 169 F. 2d 94 (1948) ("I see no reason why irrational
procedural formalism, judicial red-tape-ism, yielding injustice, should not be re-
pudiated in the appellate process, when no statute stands in the way.").
'36 STAT. 291 §6 (1910), 45 U. S. C. §56 (1946).
2 Holding such contracts valid on the theory that venue is merely the place of
enforcing liability are: Roland v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 65 F. Supp. 630
(N. D. Ill. 1946); Herrington v. Thompson, 61 F. Supp. 903 (W. D. Mo. 1945);
Clark v. Lowden, 48 F. Supp. 261 (D. Minn. 1942); Detwiler v. Lowden, 198
Minn. 185, 269 N. W. 367 (1936). Holding such contracts invalid are: Krenger
v. Pennsylvania R. R., 8 F. R. D. 65 (E. D. N. Y. 1947) ; Fleming v. Husted, 68
F. Supp. 900 (S. D. Iowa 1946); Sherman v. Pere Marquette Ry., 62 F. Supp.
590 (N. D. I1. 1945) ("The beneficial effects of the statute should not be
whittled away by the courts by distinguishing between adjective and substantive
rights. . . ."); Peterson v. Ogden U. Ry., 110 Utah 573, 175 P. 2d 744 (1946).
Compare Porter v. Fleming, 74 F. Supp. 378 (D. Minn. 1947).
'Akerly v. New York C. R. R., 68 F. 2d 812 (C. C. A. 6th 1948).
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order to relieve the employees of the inconvenience and expense of
travelling to the residence of the defendant to bring suit, Congress added
to the Act the broader provisions for venue. When the employees used
these liberal provisions to bring suits in forums distant from the scene
of the accident or the residence of the parties, the courts sought, at the
instance of the railroads, to use their power to avoid such vexatious
litigation by compelling the plaintiff to select a more convenient forum.
The problem the courts faced was whether or not they had the power
to defeat the plaintiff's choice of forum when Congress had conferred
a special right upon the employee to sue there. Put more simply, had
Congress intended that the venue privilege under the FELA should be
an absolute right given the employee with which the courts could not
interfere ?
The contracts of the type in the instant case were a result of the
railroads' attempts to limit venue extra-judicially, inasmuch as they had
met with no success in attempting to invoke judicial methods. The
judicial method first attempted was the use of the injunction. Courts
of a state have the general equitable power to enjoin citizens of the
state from prosecuting vexatious suits in a foreign forum. But the
federal courts would not exercise such equitable power of injunction
where a FELA suit was begun in a federal court, either on the ground
of inconvenience to the defendant or that such suit would burden inter-
state commerce, since Congress has the right to place such incidental
burdens by jurisdictional statutes. 4 Nor may a federal court enjoin the
prosecution of an action in a state court because of Section 265 of the
Judicial Code. 5
In Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner6 the Supreme Court decided
that a state court may not enjoin a suit under the FELA begun in a
federal court. This case followed the settled line of authority which
preceded it,7 and it is not the actual decision that made legal history,
'Chesepeake & Ohio Ry. v. Vigor, 90 F. 2d 7 (C. C. A. 6th 1937) ; Baltimore
& Ohio R. R. v. Clem, 36 F. Supp. 703 (N. D. W. Va. 1941).
Now §2283 of the revised Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. C. S. §2283 (1948)
(prohibits federal courts, with certain exceptions, from granting an injunction to
stay proceedings in a state court-see note 27 infra). Southern Ry. v. Painter,
314 U. S. 155 (1941), reversing 117 F. 2d 100 (C. C. A. 8th 1941). The Circuit
Court of Appeals held that §262 of the Judicial Code [now §1651(a), 28 U. S.
C. C. S. §1651(a) (1948)1 which allows a court to issue any writ necessary to
protect its jurisdiction gave the federal court power to enjoin an action in the
state court to obtain injunction restraining prosecution of suit in federal court.
In Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (C. C. A. 8th 1923) the
court issued an injunction on the same facts. The Supreme Court in the Painter
case did not mention this decision.
314 U. S. 44 (1941).
'Before the Kepner case the leading case was Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v.
Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (C. C. A. 8th 1923) which held the state court could not
interfere with rights created by federal law by means of an injunction based on
the public policy expressed in a statute preventing soliciting injury claims arising
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but rather the rationale used to reach it. In the majority opinion Mr.
justice Reed says, "A- privilege of venue, granted by the legislative body
which created this right of action, cannot be frustrated for reasons of
convenience or expense. If it is deemed unjust, the remedy is legis-
lative .... -8 This language forecast the conclusion that special venue
statutes create an absolute right given by Congress which is not subject
to interference, either by injunction or in any other manner except by
legislation. The cases following the Kepner case arrived at this inevi-
table conclusion.
Before this conclusion was reached, however, there was one situation
in which the railroads might obtain an injunction. Although §6 of the
FELA provides that the state courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction
with the federal courts, the state courts found nothing in the FELA, as
did the federal courts, to prevent their exercising the power of in-
junction. They therefore enjoined their citizen-employees from prose-
cuting the foreign suit if they found it oppressive, harassing, or an
undue hardship on the railroad.0 With the advent of Miles v. Illinois
C. R. R. in 1942 the Supreme Court decided that the FELA provisions
superseded this equitable power of the state courts. Since the right to
outside the state. The court expressly put its decision on the ground of public
policy as the basis for the injunction and impliedly, left open whether or not the
state court could enjoin on the grounds of undue hardship or oppression. How-
ever, later cases held that state courts could not exercise their equitable power to
enjoin for oppression or hardship and based their decision on this case. Southern
Ry. v. Painter, 117 F. 2d 100 (C. C. A. 8th 1941), rev'd ots other grounds, 314
U. S. 155 (1941); Rader v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 108 F. 2d 980 (C. C. A.
7th 1940) ; McConnell v. Thomson, 213 Ind. 16, 8 N. E. 2d 986, 11 N. E. 2d 183
(1937). Compare Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Inlow, 64 Ohio App. 134, 28 N. E.
2d 373 (1940).
8314 U. S. 44, 54 (1941).
'Alspaugh v. New York C. & St. L. R. R., 98 Ind. App. 280, 188 N. E. 869
(1934); Kern v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. R., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N. E. 446
(1933); Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Shelly, 96 Ind. App. 273, 170 N. E.
328 (1930) ; Reed's Admx. v. Illinois C. R. R., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S. W. 794 (1918) ;
State ex rel. New York, C. & St. L. R. R. v. Nortoni, 331 Mo. 764, 55 S. W. 2d
272 (1932); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185 N. W. 218
(1921) ; accord, Mobile & Ohio R. R. v. Parrent, 260 Ill. App. 284 (1931) ; Lan-
caster v. Dunn, 153 La. 15, 95 So. 385 (1922) ; Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry. v.
Wolf, 199 Wis. 278, 226 N. W. 297 (1929). The last three cases recognized the
right to enjoin but denied on the merits. Compare Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R.
v. Ball, 126 Kan. 745, 271 Pac. 313 (1928); Southern Pacific Co. v. Baum, 39
N. M. 22, 38 P. 2d 1106 (1934) (would not enjoin on the ground of burden of
interstate commerce, and denied injunction because not sufficient hardship for in-
terference of equity) ; Payne v. Knapp, 197 Iowa 737, 198 N. W. 62 (1924) note
inconsistency in discussing venue as a federal right under FELA in connection
with state statute, but does not recognize such right as superior to the equitable
power of injunction).
Such an injunction might also enjoin the employee's witnesses from testifying,
the notary from taking their depositions, or any other person from furthering the
suit. New York, C. & St. L. R. R. v. Perdiue, 97 Ind. App. 517, 187 N. E. 349
(1933); accord, Ex parte Crandall, 53 F. 2d 969 (C. C. A. 7th 1931) (federal
court denied habeas corpus where petitioner cited for contempt for disobeying
such an injunction).
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sue under the FELA springs from federal law, the right to sue in the
state courts is of the same quality as such right in the federal courts
and "is no more subject to interference by state action than was the
federal venue in the Kepner case."' 0 Hence a state court may not now
enjoin proceedings in another state court under FELA on the ground
of inconvenience and expense, and the language is broad enough to
include the ground of burden on interstate commerce."
Related to the injunction cases have been those involving the duty
of courts to take jurisdiction; that is, whether or not they may apply the
doctrine of forum non conveniens either on the ground of inconven-
ience or undue burden on interstate commerce. That the federal courts
cannot refuse to take jurisdiction on either ground is well-settled.
1 2
In the Second Employers' Liability Cases13 it was held that a state
court may not refuse to entertain jurisdiction of a FEL'A suit on the
ground that the Act is against public policy. From the Court's lan-
guage' 4 it seemed that the state had no discretion to refuse to hear
such a suit and many cases so held.' 5  But in Douglas v. New York,
N. Y. & H. R. R.,16 seventeen years later, the Supreme Court decided
that since New York had a statute restricting actions arising out of
the state betveen non-residents, the New York court had discretion in
refusing to entertain a suit under FELA. Congress did not require
the state courts to take jurisdiction but only empowered them to do so,
and there is nothing in the Act that purports to force a duty upon such
courts as against an otherwise "valid excuse." This case is often cited
as holding that a state court may apply forum non conveniens in a
FELA suit, but in other cases where the courts have refused to take
jurisdiction similar statutes of the states regulating venue have been
involved.' 7 On the other hand, in cases not involving a state statute,
-0 315 U. S. 698, 704 (1942).
" Id. at 701, 702 and 705; id. at 707 (concurring opinion). See note 22 infra.1 Wood v. Delaware & H. R. R., 63 F. 2d 235 (C. C. A. 2d 1933) ; Southern
Ry. v. Cochran, 56 F. 2d 1019 (C. C. A. 6th 1932); Schendel v. McGee, 300 Fed.
273 (C. C. A. 8th 1924); Norris v. Illinois C. R. R., 18 F. 2d 584 (D. Minn.
1925) ; Trapp v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 283 Fed. 655 (N. D. Ohio 1922) ; Con-
nelly v. Central R. R., 238 Fed. 932 (S. D. N. Y. 1916) ; see Schilling v. Delaware
& H. R. R., 114 F. 2d 69, 72 (C. C. A. 2d 1940). For a critical discussion of
these decisions see Note, 3 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 251 (1942).
13223 U. S. 1 (1912).
1 Id. at 58 ("The existenca of the jurisdiction creates an implication of duty
to exercise it, and that its exercise may be onerous does not militate against
that implication.").
"0Taylor v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 292 Ill. App. 457, 11 N. E. 2d 610
(1937); Holmberg v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 188 Mich. 605, 155 N. W. 504
(1915); Witort v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 178 Minn. 261, 226 N. W. 934 (1929);
State ex rel. Schendel v. District Court of Lyon County, 156 Minn. 380, 194 N. W.
780 (1923).
10279 U. S. 377 (1929).
11Taylor v. Southern Ry., 350 Ill. 139, 182 N. E. 805 (1932); Walton v.
Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, 115 N. E. 2d (1917); Murnan v. Wabash Ry., 246 N. Y. 244,
158 N. E. 508 (1927) ; Loftus v. Pennsylvania R. R., 107 Ohio St. 352, 140 N. E.
94 (1923).
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the courts have found a duty to exercise jurisdiction in spite of a claim
of burden on interstate commerce or inconvenience.18 These courts cite
the Douglas case but distinguish it on the ground that they have no
statute giving them discretion to refuse jurisdiction as did the New
York court.
While a statute regulating venue is a "valid excuse" for refusing
jurisdiction, a state court has apparently never found forum non con-
veniens or a claim of burden on interstate commerce'" a "valid excuse."
Furthermore, the Miles case has been held to embrace the proposition
that a state court cannot apply the doctrine 20 (unless statutory-the
Miles decision did not overrule the Douglas case). In spite of Mr.
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in the Miles case, 21 the courts have
felt that the same reasoning used in the injunction cases applies in
cases involving a refusal to take jurisdiction. If the venue right is
absolute, it is no more subject to interference by the latter than by the
former. With this same idea of an absolute right in mind, later cases
construed the Miles and Kepner cases as prohibiting interference on the
ground of burdening interstate commerce,22 as well as on the ground of
18 Beem v. Illinois C. R. R., 55 F. 2d 708 (D. Minn. 1930) ; fIoch v. Byram,
180 Minn. 298, 230 N. W. 823 (1930) ; Boright v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 180
Minn. 52, 230 N. W. 457 (1930); Winders v. Illinois C. R. R., 177 Minn. 1, 223
N. W. 291, 226 N. W. 213 (1929); Bright v. Wheelock, 323 Mo. 840, 20 S. W.
2d 684 (1929).
19 Cf. McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 292 U. S. 230 (1934). But cf. Mich-
igan C. R. R. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492 (1929) (see note 22 infra).
2 Butts v. Southern Pac. Co., 69 F. Supp. 895 (S. D. N. Y. 1947) ; Sacco v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 56 F. Supp. 959 (E. D. N. Y. 1944); see United States
v. National City Lines, 68 Sup. Ct. 1169, 1181 (1948) (". . . whenever Congress
has vested courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine causes and has invested
complaining litigants with a right of choice among them which is inconsistent
with the exercise by those courts of discretionary power to defeat the choice so
made, the doctrine [forum non conveniens] can have no effect," citing Kepner and
Miles cases); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 504 (1947) ("It is true
that in cases under the FELA we have held plaintiff's choice of forum cannot be
defeated on the basis of forum non conveniens. But this was because the special
venue act under which those cases are brought was believed to require it." For
a discussion of forum non conveniens and other types of special venue statutes,
see Note, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 34 VA. L. 1Ev. 819) ; Porter
v. Fleming, 74 F. Supp. 378, 379 (D. Minn. 1947).
And the same result has been reached in the state courts. Leet v. Union Pac.
R. R., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 155 P. 2d 42 (1944), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 866 (1945)
("The doctrine of forum non conveniens, claim of burden on interstate commerce
or war conditions constitute no justification for a refusal to exercise jurisdic-
tion. . . . While some of the foregoing authorities involved an injunction . . .
as distinguished from a motion in the forum to refuse jurisdiction, the principle
is the same."). Compare this language with the concurring opinion in the Miles
case in note 21 infra.
21315 U. S. 698, 708 (1942) (Mr. Justice Jackson would limit the decision to
injunctions only. He agrees that one state court may not close the doors of the
courts of another state to a plaintiff with a federal cause of action, but he is not
willing to admit that the courts of the states can be told by Congress that they
must entertain jurisdiction of these suits).
" Butts v. Southern Pac. Co., 69 F. Supp. 895 (S. D. N. Y. 1947); Union
Pacific R. R. v. Utterback, 173 Ore. 572, 146 P. 2d 76 (1944); Leet v. Union
Pac. R. R., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 155 P. 2d 42 (1944), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 866 (1945)
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inconvenience. With the cases following these two, the forecast of the
Kepner case became a reality; the railroads were deprived of every
judicial means attempted thus far to limit this right. Assuming that the
instant case (which was the first circuit court of appeals decision on
the matter) was indicative of the future attitude of the courts as to
venue, contracts, then the picture was complete. The only remedy lay
with Congress.
The Jennings Bil123 sought to amend the FELA venue section and
practically eliminate the provision authorizing suits where the railroad
is doing business. This bill passed the House in the 80th Congress, but
at the close of the second session was still in the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee; Whether or not the pressure for such an amendment will cease
remains to be determined by the effect on the problem of the new Title
28 of the United States Code. In the revision of the Code which was
effective September 1, 1948, Congress incorporated a provision giving
express statutory power to the federal courts to apply the doctrine of
forum ion conveniens.24 Apparently it was the intent of Congress that
this provision, should apply to FELA suits, as the revisory committee
expressly stated that the purpose of the statute is to relieve the situation
under the decision of the Kepner case. The Supreme Court has held
that the test of whether or not an absolute right in the venue exists
is "not to be answered by such indecisive inquiries as whether the venue
or jurisdictional statute is labelled a 'special' or 'general' one. . . . It
is rather to be decided, upon consideration of all the relevant materials,
by whether the legislative purpose and the effect of the language used
(cites Miles case that Congress has exercised its authority over interstate com-
merce and permits such suits despite the incidental burden on a defendant, where
process may be obtained on a defendant not merely soliciting business but actually
carrying on railroading by operating trains and maintaining traffic offices within
the territory of the court's jurisdiction). Butts v. Southern Pac. Co., supra at
896 distinguishes Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312 (1923)
on the ground that a state may not burden interstate commerce, but Congress may.
In note 11 at page 51 of the Kepner case, it is stated: "Michigan Central v. Mix
...turn[s? on the absence of inconsequential character of business done within
the states where the railroads were sued." It seems that the Mix case is not
authority that the courts may refrain from exercising jurisdiction on the ground
of burden on interstate commerce where the forum is otherwise proper, but rather
that there was not sufficient business done in the state to constitute proper venue
within §6, and to so find on the facts would be a burdening of interstate com-
merce by the state court. Cf. Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel. Foraker, 274 U. S. 21
(1927) (where Court on the facts finds sufficient doing of business to take juris-
diction under FELA).
2s H. R. 1639. This bill provided the plaintiff could sue only where the cause
of action arose or where plaintiff resided at the time of injury, unless could not
serve defendant with process issuing out of any of the courts mentioned, in which
case could sue where the defendant does business. For a criticism of the pro-
visions of the bill see 34 A. B. A. J. 454 (1948).
2428 U. S. C. C. S. §1404(a) (1948) ("For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought.").
"2 See Reviser's Notes to §1404(a) in 28 U. S. C. C. S. at p. 1853.
1949]
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to achieve it were to vest the power of choice in the plaintiff or to
confer power upon the courts to qualify his selection. '20  In the past,
courts have considered this particular venue statute as conferring a
special right because of its legislative history. Now Congress has mani-
fested an intent to confer power upon the courts to qualify the selection
of forum. Therefore, applying the test laid down by the Supreme
Court, it is submitted that this is no longer an absolute right. Without
this idea of an absolute right, the obstacle to using injunctions in the
federal courts no longer exists; interference by injunction should be
allowed if it is allowed by applying forum non conveniens. The rule
that a federal court may not enjoin the proceeding in a state court will,
of course, remain unchanged.2 T As for the state courts, the Miles case
pointed out that the right to sue in state courts under the Act is of the
same quality as such right in the federal courts. It would seem to
follow that if venue is subject to interference in the federal courts,
it may also be interfered with in the state courts. The state courts
would again say that nothing in the FELA prevents their applying
forum non conveniens or granting injunctions.
It is hoped that the courts will not hold the new provision of the
Judicial Code applicable only in cases arising under the general venue
provisions of the federal courts.27 If, instead, the courts do carry out
the apparent intent of Congress and apply the doctrine of forum nwn
conveniens in suits brought under the FELA, they would provide a
solution fair to both employee and railroad in that the injured employee
would still have a wide choice of forums but where this right was
abused the courts could protect the defendant by refusing to exercise
jurisdiction.
KATHERINE S. WRIGHT.
Criminal Procedure-Method of Raising Constitutional Issues-
Writ of Coram Nobis
The federal courts have become increasingly zealous of protecting
the rights of those whose convictions have been obtained without due
". United States v. National City Lines, 68 Sup. Ct. 1169, 1182 (1948).
2' Section 2283 of the revised Judicial Code incorporates some general excep-
tions which the old §265 did not have. One of these exceptions wyas put in to
overrule Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118 (1941), which de-
cision was followed by Southern Ry. v. Painter, 314 U. S. 155 (1941) (see note
5 supra). The exception will not apply in the Painter case, however, because in
that case there was no federal decree to protect as in the Toucey case. See South-
ern Ry. v. Painter, supra at 160 (concurring opinion) ; Reviser's Notes to §2283,
28 U. S. C. C. S. at page 1910.
-" Since the preparation of this note three federal district courts have decided
that §1404(a) of the revised Judicial Code applies to suits under the FELA.
Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 79 F. Supp. 821 (D. Minn. 1948); White v.
Thompson, 80 F. Supp. 411 (N. D. Ill. 1948); Nunn v. Chicago, M., St. P. &
P. R. R., 80 F. Supp. 745 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
